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ABSTRACT Since the early 1990s, the European Union has developed new instruments
to consolidate its external action, especially in ‘low politics’. These new instruments
include the signing of interregional arrangements with other regional groups. The EU’s
region–to–region strategy towards the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) is in
keeping with the latest trends of interregionalism. Since the birth of Mercosur, the EU
has given technical, financial and diplomatic support to South America’s new regional-
ism. The long–term goal is to conclude a region–to–region agreement in the political,
cooperation and trade fields. By providing this support, the EU plays a role as an ‘exter-
nal federator’ for new regional experiences through its interregionalist projects.
Although ‘new interregionalism’ is a corollary of the new regionalism, interregionalism
can contribute to the consolidation of regionalism. Moreover, by encouraging
economic multilateralism, interregional arrangements can improve the governance of
globalisation.
KEY WORDS: European Union, Mercosur, interregionalism, regionalism, United States, 
Free Trade Area of the Americas
1. Introduction
New regionalism, as a trend, has been developing for more than fifteen years.
Some of these regional spaces have reached a level of development that
enables them to play a role on the global scene. This is the case for the
European Union which, from the early 1990s, has deepened its institutional
architecture and strengthened its international influence. Since the Treaty of
Maastricht, the EU has adopted a new type of cooperation agreement in
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order to develop relations with third partners. These agreements have
enabled the EU to negotiate region–to–region association with other regional
groups. Questions of a political, security, cooperation, environmental and/or
trade nature may be tackled within these frameworks. The relations devel-
oped with the Common Market of the South (Comisión Sectorial para el
Mercado Común del Sur — Mercosur) perfectly illustrate the new wave of
interregional arrangements that are emerging and shaping global gover-
nance. EU–Mercosur relations are based on three pillars: political dialogue,
cooperation and trade.
With regard to the EU/Mercosur relations, different issues will be covered
in this analysis. Do interregional arrangements enable the EU to increase its
external action in ‘low politics’ and, if so, to what extent? What are the
consequences of these interregional agreements for the new regional schemes
such as Mercosur? By promoting interregional relations, is the EU becoming
an ‘external federator’ for new regional experiences? In other words, are the
new interregional arrangements only a corollary of new regionalism or might
interregionalism also be considered a factor of consolidation for regional
groups? Because interregional projects or agreements generally include fairly
ambitious trade liberalisation agendas, the links between interregionalism
and multilateralism are also assessed here. In the light of this case study,
could we say that interregionalism arrangements, as well as regionalism, are
undermining or encouraging economic multilateralism? By tackling this
question, the analysis also focuses on the underlying ideology of new trends
in regionalism and interregionalism.
2. The EU’s International Role and New Regionalism in Latin America
The EU: an Emerging International Actor
The third summit between the heads of state and government of the European
Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, in Guadalajara (Mexico) in May
2004, enabled the EU1 to play a role for the first time on the international
scene in its enlarged, 25–country, configuration. This summit was in line with
the thinking associated with the ‘Rio Process’,2 which, according to the Rio
de Janeiro declaration of June 1999, aimed to achieve a “strategic biregional”
(European Parliament 1999: 1) partnership between the EU and Latin
America and the Caribbean, supported by a political dialogue as well as coop-
eration and trade. In so doing, the EU was gradually pursuing its strategy of
rapprochement with Latin America and the Caribbean, a sub–continent that,
for decades, has been subject to what could only be described as the discre-
tionary domination of the US. At the same time, the EU reiterated its willing-
ness to play a role on the world stage with a single voice, notwithstanding
the intra–European divisions that arose just prior to the summit held after the
2003 Iraq war.
The Community’s first attempts at rapprochement with some countries or
regional groups in Latin America were made in the 1970s. However, it was
not until the 1990s that the EU adopted a strategy for all of Latin America
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and the Caribbean (European Commission 1994a). This strategy of bringing
together the two sides of the Atlantic was a European initiative, part of the
change in the international context. With the end of the Cold War, the
European Community — and Japan — began to emerge alongside the US as
the new power centres in a world that was increasingly economically inter-
dependent. This emergence of areas that had struggled to find their feet during
the 1970s increased the competition among them and the US, helping to
weaken the economic position of the US. At that time, the US economy was
running out of steam, fuelling debate about its hegemonic decline (Telò 2001).
As globalisation accelerated, the Community’s member states became
more aware of the difficulties arising from globalisation, such as the ability
to play an independent role internationally. The increase in globalisation —
which, since the 1970s, has resulted in growing economic, financial and trade
liberalisation worldwide — has greatly reinforced market ideologies. As a
result, the concept of the welfare state has been vigorously questioned. There
has also been a gradual dismantling of state barriers to the market economy
and international capital movements (Santander 2000a).
The world’s states and their economies have become increasingly open to
the outside world, making them more interdependent and exposing them to
more economic competition. One result, though to different degrees, is less
effective national economic policies. This process, to which some states —
following the example of the US, EU countries and Japan — have deliberately
contributed more than others (Gill 1995), has weakened the power of the
state. Yet the process has especially benefited the transnational economic
actors that play on the same field as states or international bodies. Transna-
tional enterprises have gained most from this change, acquiring more and
more power to influence the domestic policies of states and the international
relations process (Stopford & Strange 1991). This trend has also been
facilitated by the development of new information technologies, which are
structurally linked to deregulation (Telò 1998, 29).
It is against this background of accelerating global competition, states’
weakened control over their national economies and the lack of satisfactory
global structures that the development of regional structures has become
more important in the eyes of states themselves (Gamble & Payne 1996,
251–252; Ténier 2003). The regional repositioning of states, in the late
1980s, gave rise to the new regionalism. Of course, there are many kinds of
regional integration, which is why some prefer to speak of “new regional-
isms” (Marchand et al. 1999). The unifying logic behind them varies widely
from one regional organisation to another. Differences may depend on
whether the organisations are pursuing a strictly trade objective, have
common development policies, or bring together the countries of the North
and/or the South (Santander 2004b). Some of these groups, taking their cue
from Mercosur, were set up later. Others, such as the EU, were reinvigorated.
In an unprecedented way, states — just like the US — were converted to the
idea of regionalism.
However, the development of European regionalism from the mid–1980s
transformed regionalism into an integration phenomenon without precedent,
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defying the pessimistic forecasts made by the realist scholars (Mearsheimer
1990, 199; Waltz 1993). From that moment on, the European bloc began to
strengthen its internal structures and to adopt instruments consolidating its
visibility and external action. The revival of European integration was part
of the growing interdependence movement that resulted from globalisation
and the new regionalist wave mentioned above. The end of the Cold War
bipolar system offered the EU new international roles and a space to play
them. The 1990s allowed the Union — whose activities internationally were
no longer conditioned by bipolar rivalry — to embark on the “route of a
clearer affirmation of its identity as an international actor” (Remacle 2000,
487). The member states focused on doing more than just the coordination
foreseen under European Political Cooperation (EPC). Through the Maas-
tricht Treaty, they gave themselves a Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) allowing “the definition in the long term of a common defence policy,
which would result, at the right time, in a common defence” (EU, Selected
instruments). Moreover, the instrument of political dialogue3 conducted
with the external partners was strengthened. This initiative enabled the EU
to present itself to others with a single voice and to make good and frequent
contacts with third countries and regional groups, to establish links and
exchange respective views on international issues.
However, following Europe’s inability to move beyond a mainly declara-
tive diplomacy when it came to acting with one voice and acting effectively
in ‘high politics’ arenas — such as ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia,
genocide in Rwanda or the war in Iraq — serious doubts were expressed by
the realist scholars about the EU’s capacity to become a genuine international
actor. By institutionalising the CFSP, the European heads of state and
government raised expectations that they were not able to meet, due to a lack
of compromise. This situation gave rise to the notion of a “capability–
expectations gap” (Hill 1993). Believing that strategic issues are essentially
based on post–bipolar international relations, the realist critics focus as
much on the status of the EU as they do on its instruments for carrying out
political and strategic actions. Since the EU is not a sovereign entity but more
an entity subordinate to member states (it lacks a centralised decision–
making authority and has no real military capacity of its own), it cannot
really be seen as an international actor.
By concentrating on a state–centred and strategic conception, realist
scholars reduce the EU’s international sphere of activity to the CFSP
(Petiteville 2002, 152–53) alone. Yet in other fields (‘low politics’), such as
foreign trade and cooperation with other countries or regional spaces, the
Community has a genuinely influential role worldwide. In world trade, the
EU has 20 per cent of the world’s total volume of imports and exports,
compared with 18 per cent for the US and 10 per cent for Japan. After more
than forty years of trade integration, the Union now figures among the
planet’s leading trading powers. Given that the EU plays a crucial role in
drawing up rules for trade multilateralism and globalisation in general, it
has a genuine world leadership role to play in the WTO’s trade negotiations
(Smith & Woolcock 1999). That is because, with a few exceptions,4 the
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European Commission’s mandate to negotiate is granted by the Council of
Ministers with a qualified majority. The mandate empowers the Commis-
sion to draw up a proposal document, to defend member states’ trade inter-
ests at the WTO and to routinely manage trade policy. European trade
policy, therefore, acts as a real lever at the Community level. This policy has
allowed the Union to simultaneously develop a network of new agreements
— for economic cooperation, association or partnership — such as those
negotiated or in the process of conclusion with countries or regional groups
of Latin America.
Following the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the new cooperation
programmes have included a chapter on political dialogue. Besides the ‘tradi-
tional’ chapters on cooperation (technical, economic, trade and/or assis-
tance), these programmes also focus on policy that gives a major role to
democratisation, human rights and democratic principles. Many Community
cooperation agreements are now distinguished by their ‘democratic princi-
ples’ clause — setting a democratic conditionality — which could be inter-
preted as an increasing politicisation of economic cooperation (de Wilde
d’Estmael 1998). To underline the Union’s capacity for international action,
we will look at the EU’s interregionalist strategy with Mercosur.
The EU and Latin America: From ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Interregionalism
EU/Mercosur relations date from the signing of the Treaty of Asunción
(1991), which created Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay).
The Union was motivated to develop relations with the South American
countries following their political, democratic and economic development. In
the late 1980s, Argentina and Brazil moved beyond their long–standing
rivalry for regional leadership and engaged in an unprecedented process of
political and economic rapprochement, which served as a platform for
Mercosur’s creation.
The world’s leading economic power centres took notice when the region
became politically stable and began adopting competitive and outward–
looking economic policies. They saw an opportunity for new outlets for their
enterprises. The enthusiasm for this “emerging” (Sautter 1996) area owes
much to the markets’ unilateral openness policies. Other reasons include
racing to privatise public enterprises, deregulation and liberalisation of
economic activities, stabilising macro–economic policies to attract Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and a far–reaching reform of the state. These policies
coincided with the creation of Mercosur, which enabled member states to
strengthen their neo–liberal reforms and which was a key part of their
international economic policy (Cammack 1999, 103). With its 210 million
inhabitants, a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 1,000 billion US dollars and
very strong growth in its intraregional trade, Mercosur quickly became the
world’s fourth largest trading bloc — after the EU, the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) and Japan.
The development of Mercosur illustrates that current regional processes
and globalisation are not mutually exclusive trends. By committing themselves
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to a regional initiative, states are obliged to introduce integration policies to
increase the credibility of a region’s members with external actors — among
them potential investors. The conclusion of integration agreements with
neighbouring countries obliges a state to exert greater control over its own
economic policy, so as to compensate collectively at the regional scale for the
loss of national autonomy. But because globalisation was a setback for all
isolationist development strategies, the coming together of neo–liberal
economic policies has greatly facilitated the postures of regional openness
(Hettne 2001, 12; Petiteville 1997, 515). Thus, while globalisation is a series
of processes and an ideology of economic management, regionalism must be
seen as a manifestation of globalisation; the two developments reinforce one
another (Higgott 1997, 280). Hence, it is more useful to talk of neo–region-
alism than regionalism, when referring to the new regional organisations and
the relaunch of old and now reinvigorated regional agreements (Santander
2000b).
Just like neo–regionalism, ‘neo–interregionalism’ is not a phenomenon in
contradiction with globalisation: neo–interregionalism develops within and
is constrained by the global political economy (Grugel 2002, 1). Both these
phenomena have become characteristic elements of post–Cold War global
governance at multiple levels. Neo–interregionalism is a corollary of the new
regional agreements. However, as will be shown later, interregionalism can
contribute to the consolidation of regionalism. Thus, there is a two–way
relationship between regionalism and interregionalism.5
The relations between the EU and Mercosur are based on group–to–group
dialogue. This kind of interregionalist initiative, first seen in the 1970s, was
related to ‘old’ regionalism (Hänggi 2000, 4–5). It was the fruit of European
Community action. With the Andean Pact, the Community supported the
Latin American regional integration efforts.6 Support was limited to trade and
development cooperation. Inspired by its own integration model, the EU grad-
ually realised that “subjects of a political nature, such as the prevention of
conflicts and the war on drugs, could be tackled in a more appropriate way
by increasing the efforts made at the regional level” (European Commission
1995a, 2). The creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC) facilitated
the development of group–to–group political dialogue (Regelsberger 1998, 2).
A typical example of the ‘old’ interregionalism is the one the EC developed
with the countries of the Central American Common Market (CACM).7 The
armed conflicts in Central America in the 1980s encouraged the EC to play
a major political role as an international broker. The EC established the San
José Dialogue with the countries of Central America. This dialogue involved
ministerial meetings aimed at achieving peace and democratising the region.
The European strategy was based on regular and institutionalised political
dialogue, plus a strengthening of development cooperation and support for
reinforcement of the regional space (Rubio 2004). However, the old interre-
gionalism was both sporadic and rather limited by the bipolar international
context.
With the end of the Cold War, increasing economic interdependence,
the emergence of new regionalism and both the deepening of European
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integration and the adoption of new instruments to consolidate its external
action (discussed earlier), the EU was able to develop a series of new and
much more ambitious interregional agreements. These agreements included
the group–to–group association that is being negotiated with Mercosur.
The interregional agenda now include mutual trade–liberalisation
programmes in keeping with the rules and disciplines of the international
economic institutions, such as the WTO. These new programmes are even
more ambitious than those at the multilateral level. The compatibility
required between the WTO and any other kind of free trade agreement
means there is less and less room in the interregional agreements for tradi-
tional development cooperation policies, such as the Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) granted unilaterally by the EC to regional areas made up
of developing countries such as the Andean Community (CAN) or the
CACM. As a result, while neo–interregionalism includes strategic elements,
it is distinguished by its neo–liberal economic leanings.
3. The EU Group–to–Group Strategy Towards Mercosur
Structure and Actors
Both the processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation which
took place in the late 1980s in South America, as well as the emergence of
new regionalism, were important factors for rapprochement with
Europe, according to the European Commission (European Commission
1995b, 5–6). The Commission therefore developed a strategy to institution-
alise the growing links between Europe and the countries that constitute
Mercosur. ‘Third–generation’ agreements signed between 1990 and 1992
with each of the four countries of Mercosur replaced the ‘empty–shell’ agree-
ments of the 1970s and 1980s and revitalised relations. The new agreements
are notable for the interest paid to integration and regional cooperation.
They are also unique for the inclusion of two clauses. The ‘democratic
principles’ clause calls for respect to the basic principles that stem from a
heritage of common values. The ‘future developments’ clause enables the
contracting parties to complete and increase their level of cooperation,
moving beyond trade alone (European Commission 1995b, 8).
Behind these new agreements is an EU eager to develop interregional
group–to–group relations with Mercosur. The EU capitalised on the interest
expressed by Mercosur members to sign an agreement for inter–institutional
cooperation. The agreement’s main goal was to allow Mercosur to benefit
from European experience in regional integration, so Mercosur could even-
tually become the Community’s main partner in relations with the Southern
Common Market countries. Following this, the EU began to offer assistance
to Mercosur with technical norms, tariffs and agriculture.
The EU provides Mercosur’s Secretariat with technical assistance in fields
such as training, computer networks, documentation and archives. It also
supports Mercosur presidencies in promotion activities such as seminars
and conferences. Mercosur also benefits from a programme establishing a
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customs code, which has resulted in Europe–based training courses for
customs officials, and missions by European experts to Mercosur customs
administrations. Cooperation has also covered assistance from the European
Standardisation Committee (CEN) in drawing up technical and quality
standards (courses, international meetings, training and annual conferences),
as well as help with agricultural projects (institutional aspects, veterinary and
phytosanitary sectors). This cooperation has enabled the EU to export its
regional governance model and to increase its reputation as an international
actor (Santander 2001). Furthermore, the group–to–group strategy has
encouraged the harmonisation of economic rules at the regional level so that
Mercosur could create its own customs union. A union like this will allow
European enterprises to trade freely (without customs barriers) and to enjoy
economies of scale.8
European technical assistance provided to Mercosur, in addition to the
accompanying political and institutional dialogue, proved essential during
the period of uncertainty experienced by the South American bloc from 1992
to 1993. At that time, Brazil, led by President Collor, dealt with a serious
economic, political and institutional crisis. Argentina, under President
Menem, was dissociating itself from its Brazilian neighbour and warmly
welcomed the offer from the US to join the group of negotiating countries in
NAFTA. The US proposal endangered the objective that Mercosur member
states had fixed for themselves under the 1991 Treaty of Asunción, namely
the creation by 1995 of a common external tariff with a view to setting up a
free trade area and a customs union. Throughout this period of uncertainty,
the EU supported Mercosur and developed a substantial political and diplo-
matic dialogue with the organisation (Hillcoat 1997, 105).
The US proposal was in keeping with its dual–track strategy for trade
liberalisation (Payne 1996). While pressing for progress in trade multilat-
eralism, the US envisioned, in the transitional period between the bipolar
and post–Cold War eras, a strategic network of regional, transregional
and hybrid agreements.9 The aim was to integrate all nations into a frame-
work of norms and behaviour — a framework inspired by the United
States. To that end, the US became actively involved in Asia–Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC). In 1990 it launched the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI), to create a free trade area from Alaska in the
north to Tierra del Fuego in the south. The EAI was followed by a hybrid
agreement with the four countries of Mercosur under the name ‘4 + 1’,
then by NAFTA and the launch of the negotiations for the transregional
free trade area of the Americas (FTAA). Contrary to the European vision,
the US authorities consider that the Latin American regional spaces are
merely temporary and must eventually be absorbed into the broader
spaces proposed by the US (Bergsten 1996). The integrationist project
under development in South America is viewed with suspicion by the US,
as the project is a barrier to its pan–American free trade initiative. The US
proposed that pro–American Argentina (then under Menem) should join
its project, hoping this would destabilise Mercosur and gradually extend
NAFTA to the rest of the Americas.
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The EU was aware of the threat posed by the US project to its strategy of
rapprochement with Asia, Latin America and, of course, Mercosur. In a
European Commission communication, the EU revealed to what extent the
signing of the trade agreements with third countries or groups is economi-
cally and strategically important for the Union: 
FTAs [free trade areas] are economically beneficial, especially where they help the
EU to bolster its presence in the faster growing economies of the world, which is
our overriding interest. … This direct economic justification has also been supple-
mented by strategic considerations regarding the need to reinforce our presence
in particular markets and to attenuate the potential threat of others establishing
privileged relations with countries which are economically important to us (Euro-
pean Commission 1995c, 7).
The fear of being squeezed out of South America stimulated the EU to react,
all the more so because, in capturing 60 per cent of the investments made by
European enterprises in Latin America, Mercosur became a leading partner
of the EU in the Latin American sub–continent (Giordano & Santiso 2000,
59). European Commissioner Manuel Marín, who had the Latin America
portfolio under the Santer Commission, proposed that the economic and
trade links be enhanced in two stages; first, through the setting up of an inter-
regional agreement for economic and trade cooperation and second, through
the implementation of an interregional association of a political and
economic nature, aimed at encouraging interregional flows, promoting the
strategy of investments by enterprises and reinforcing political cooperation
at the international level through convergence of the positions of the EU and
Mercosur in international bodies (European Commission 1994b).
By approving this strategy, the Essen European Council of December
1994 decided to set up “a new and extended partnership between the two
regions” European Council 1994, 16). In the same period, the four presi-
dents of Mercosur member states meeting at the Ouro Preto summit
(Brazil) approved this strategic move. On 22 December 1994 in Brussels, a
“joint formal declaration of the Council of the European Union and the
European Commission, on the one hand, and the member states of Merco-
sur, on the other hand” stipulated that the parties are committed to
“concluding an interregional framework agreement concerning economic
and trade cooperation” during 1995 and to “set up a closer political coop-
eration” (Official Journal of the Communities 1994, 1–2). The European
Parliament (European Parliament 1995, 10) and the Economic and Social
Committee (European Economic and Social Committee 1996, 135–140)
supported the strengthening of relations between the EU and Mercosur.
For the European Parliament, a rapprochement such as this preserved the
EU’s trade role and prevented the whole of the Latin American Southern
Cone from falling under the US umbrella. Lastly, the Cannes European
Council of June 1995 gave the Commission a mandate to complete the
negotiations of an interregional framework agreement with Mercosur;
Mercosur heads of state gathered in Asunción in August 1995 to confirm
the mandate for negotiations.
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At the Madrid European Council of December 1995, the Union and Merco-
sur signed the fourth–generation EU–Mercosur Interregional Framework for
Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA), which includes the democratic and
future developments clauses of the third–generation agreements. By associat-
ing two customs unions, this agreement added something new to international
relations. The signing of the framework agreement between two regions was
only possible because Mercosur was given a legal status in international law,
following a demand made by the EU. This status allowed it to sign interna-
tional agreements and trade conventions. The hope of gaining access to the
European market after the signing of a trade agreement with the Union
boosted the development of Mercosur, dispelling the prospect of a weakened
bloc in the continental liberalisation movement launched by the US. Thus
there was confirmation of the theory that the EU has a role as an “external
federator” (Rüland 2002a, 11) for new regional experiences, through its inter-
regionalist projects.
The EMIFCA is based on three pillars. The first institutionalises a regular
‘political dialogue’ for bi–regional consultation and coordination of the part-
ners’ positions on multilateral questions in the international bodies. The
second foresees cooperation in fields such as the war on drugs and its conse-
quences, culture, information and communication, as well as training in
regional integration with a focus on the social dimension. Mercosur has also
requested that there be some cooperation on regional integration, to help the
body benefit from European experience. The third and last pillar focuses on
strengthening economic and commercial cooperation “which should include
a liberalisation of all trade in goods and services, aiming at free trade, in
conformity with WTO rules”. For the EU, this type of agreement should act
as a propellor for multilateral trade liberalisation, since the EU believes that
“FTAs promote the principle of open regionalism and can generate trade
liberalisation that subsequently spreads to the multilateral field” (European
Commission 1995c, 7). In reality, the FTAs must be WTO–plus agreements.
In other words, the trade negotiations at the interregional level should aim
to achieve more than those at the multilateral level. In this way, by effectively
supporting the economic and trade harmonisation of the other regional
spaces and then signing interregional trade agreements with them, the EU
seeks to drive forward the multilateral liberalisation programmes.
In this process of rapprochement between the EU and Mercosur, transna-
tional companies started progressively and naturally to play a very dynamic
role. In a very short time period, the flows of private capital and commercial
trade increased exponentially, making Europe the leading investor and trading
partner of the Southern Cone, ahead of the US. The Europeans became the
principal investors in the South American countries. European enterprises are
actively conquering the South American market, benefiting from the regional
integration efforts and the privatisation and macro–economic stability poli-
cies that result from the Argentine convertibility plan (1991) and the plan Real
in Brazil (1994) (both linking the national currency to the US dollar).
The most active investors in the Southern Cone are Spanish, German,
French, Dutch and Italian firms. In the race to acquire markets, Spain has
The European Partnership with Mercosur 295
quickly moved to the head of the European group (ECLAC 2000). Argentina
and Brazil now account for more than half of the European capital stock
cumulated in Latin America. In Mercosur, 75 per cent of the flows go to
Brazil and 24 per cent to Argentina, compared with just one per cent for
Paraguay and Uruguay. The European investments are especially concen-
trated in the service sectors (financial, telecommunications), (Giordano &
Santiso 2000, 59–66). Since the launch of Mercosur, the Southern Cone
economies have become a magnet for European transnational companies’
strategies. These strategies see the South American market as a new financial
horizon, a way of opening up to global competition and staking the EU’s
place among competitors. For the EU, the relation with Mercosur is strategic.
This is why European enterprises wanting to see a free trade agreement
signed between the EU and Mercosur created a powerful lobby, Mercosur–
European Business Forum (MEBF) in early 1999, with the support of the
European Commission (European Commission’s Enterprise Desk 2004b).
A business forum, whose influence springs from regular meetings organised
by the negotiators, often accompanies the new trend of interregionalism. To
increase their visibility, coordinate their position so as to better promote their
interests and to apply pressure on the decision–makers (governments and
supranational institutions), these enterprises link up in fora. They can then
follow the negotiations and are well positioned to submit their proposals to
working groups and policy–makers.
The European Commission neatly sums up this situation: 
These [Business Round Tables and Dialogues] are regular events which bring
together private economic operators, providing opportunities for developing
contacts and stable networks between top industry representatives on both sides,
industrial organisations and government officials. The usual outcome of such
international meetings is recommendations addressed to the EU and the respec-
tive governments on e.g. market access, trade policy and foreign direct investment
issues. The European Commission, since the nineties, has sponsored industry–led
Industrial Round Tables … These Round Tables and Business Dialogues produce
annual recommendations aiming at the improvement of the business environ-
ment. Follow–up and progress reports are used as instruments for efficient imple-
mentation of those recommendations on both sides (European Commission’s
Enterprise Desk 2004a).
There has been considerable growth in the trade of goods. From 1990 to
1998, EU exports to the South American bloc increased by 375 per cent,
while the Community’s share of exports from Mercosur rose from 14.4 per
cent to 21.6 per cent during the same period, resulting in a major trade deficit
for the Southern Cone economies (IRELA 1999a, 11–13). The rise in
European exports to Mercosur countries was mainly the result of unilateral
trade liberalisation policies adopted by the South American governments
from the early 1990s. Because of the trade imbalance, however, the Southern
Cone national economies became much more dependent on the European
market than the EU became on Mercosur. So, in addition to the strong
dependence of the South American economies on European capital, a trade
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dependence also developed. While the EU represents 26 per cent of Merco-
sur’s external trade and thus became its leading trading partner, Mercosur
only represents 2.9 per cent of EU external trade.
With regard to the structure of trade, the Southern Cone countries —
although they have reduced the share of their raw materials exports to the
European countries since the 1970s — continue to export a large volume of
processed foodstuffs to this region. Some 51 per cent of EU imports are
agricultural goods, while these products account for only 4.5 per cent of EU
exports to Mercosur. 49 per cent of EU purchases are industrial goods, while
95.5 per cent of EU sales are industrial goods (Cienfuegos Mateo 2003, 262).
Unlike the South American exports to the EU, the European exports are
notable for their high added value. The trade structure between Mercosur
and the EU bears a strong resemblance to North–South relations.
Internal Obstacles
The external trade structure of Mercosur and of the EU is, to some extent,
complementary and favours trade rapprochement between the two parties.
Nevertheless, South American agricultural exports to the European market
face serious obstacles. First, there are numerous European non–tariff barri-
ers. Among them are phytosanitary and antidumping measures that affect
the products of key economic sectors in which the Mercosur countries have
a comparative advantage. Mercosur countries find themselves competing
unfairly for these products with European firms (IRELA 1999b, 6) because
of trade barriers that serve to protect so–called ‘sensitive’ sectors, such as
beef, cereals and sugar — sectors that are the subject of specific policies
under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which aims to protect
European agricultural production. Mercosur countries believe they are put at
a particular disadvantage by the CAP which has led to a widening of the
Mercosur trade deficit with the EU since 1995. This dossier has proved to be
a major obstacle to the launch of negotiations for a trade association between
the EU and Mercosur, an association foreseen at the first summit of the EU,
Latin America and the Caribbean in June 1999.
To start talks with the South American bloc, the European Commission
needed a negotiation mandate from the Council. But major differences arose
among the Council’s member states regarding the delivery of the negotiation
mandate to the Commission, for it was established that a free trade area with
Mercosur could seriously harm European agriculture. The majority of the
ministers of industry, economics and foreign affairs from the EU member
states appeared to support the negotiations with Mercosur. But the French,
Irish and Dutch ministers of agriculture and fisheries, under pressure from
their domestic lobbies, were opposed to this mandate (IRELA 1999a, 9).
The UK government was of the opinion that the negotiations with Merco-
sur should not begin before the end of the following WTO round. There was
also disagreement in the Santer Commission (1995–1999). The Agriculture
Commissioner Franz Fischler, supported by his colleagues from France
(Commissioners de Silguy and Cresson) and Ireland (Flynn), also opposed the
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project. Further support for this position came from the European agricul-
tural lobby COPA–COGECA,10 which was against any kind of trade agree-
ment with Mercosur (COPA 2004). Those opposed to trade liberalisation
justified their position by underlining the ‘multifunctional’ nature of agricul-
ture in Europe,11 a position deemed by Mercosur countries to be a new way
of delaying the negotiations. However, the project was supported by
Commissioner Marín, the German presidency of the EU (in the first six
months of 1999) and the Spanish, Italian and Portuguese governments, not
to mention Mercosur–European Business Forum, which was set up specifi-
cally (in February 1999) to help the interregional negotiations through a daily
dialogue between the entrepreneurs and public authorities of each region
(European Commission’ Mercosur Desk 2000, 4).
The compromise eventually achieved gave the Commission a mandate to
start the negotiations on non–tariff barriers, but delayed any discussions on
customs duties until July 2001. These discussions could not, at any rate, be
completed before the end of the WTO round, allowing the EU to avoid tack-
ling at the interregional level the question of subsidies for agricultural
exports. In any case, as far as the Union is concerned, subjects like these must
only be handled in negotiations within the WTO. The Commission, there-
fore, attended the EU–Mercosur summit (held alongside the Río summit)
with a limited negotiating mandate. It took four years from the signing of the
EU–Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement
(EMIFCA) for the representatives of the two regional blocs to build a picture
of the trade situation and, not without some disappointments for Mercosur,
to start negotiations on the non–tariff barriers alone. The negotiations were
launched during the first meeting of the Biregional Cooperation Council
(BCC), which defined the structure, methodology and schedule for the nego-
tiations and created the Biregional Negotiations Committee (BNC). The
committee, to which a Subcommittee on Cooperation (SCC), three
Subgroups on specific cooperation areas and three Technical Groups (TG)
dealing with trade matters are linked, has become the main body for negoti-
ations between the EU and Mercosur,. The four first meetings of the BNC
were limited to questions of methodology, exchange of information and
analysis of the basic prerequisites for starting the tariff negotiations. No real
progress was made, underlining deadlock in the relations.
External Factors: Facing up to US Transregionalism and Multilateral 
Negotiations
Since the US government lacked the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)12 to
foster the transregional negotiations in the Americas, the Europeans were not
too worried. But in the meantime, the George W. Bush administration —
which was determined to complete the FTAA negotiations — obtained the
TPA from the Congress. Argentina, which was plunged into an economic
crisis lasting four years, mainly as a result of the January 1999 Brazilian
currency devaluation, started to have misgivings about the raison d’être of
Mercosur and wished to become closer to the US in order to foster the FTAA.
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Taking into account these different elements as well as the fragility of
Mercosur, the US seized the occasion to propose another trade agreement to
Argentina. The US hoped to reactivate conflicts among the members of
Mercosur and to destabilise the bloc, because from the US viewpoint the
FTAA should be made a reality through country–to–country agreements and
thus through NAFTA (Santander 2002a, 494–97). By accepting such a
proposal, Argentina risked seeing its international negotiating position
weakened to the benefit of the US — as had happened when Mexico joined
NAFTA (Carranza 2004, 323).
For the EU, a trade agreement between Argentina and the US would repre-
sent the end of the South American bloc, threatening the EU’s interregionalist
strategy towards Mercosur and reinforcing the FTAA project. The EU fears
a possible trade–diversion effect from the FTAA on EU economies. For
example, when Mexico became a member of NAFTA, European companies
lost about half of the Mexican market. The EU wants to avoid this situation
happening again with Mercosur (Santander 2002b, 20–28). European lead-
ers are also aware that if the US project became a reality, it would mean an
opening of markets and the creation of new standards and rules that would
govern international trade. They fear the emergence of a US–led pan–
American bloc, which could shape the rules of the worldwide economy
(European Economic and Social Committee 2004), thus confirming the
theory that interregional and transregional arrangements are also distin-
guished by their strategic aims (Rüland 2002b, 3–4). Such agreements or
projects are often in competition, because they allow a state or regional
actors to make up for a lack of international influence or to increase their
political presence globally. The strategy of the EU towards South America is
a response to the US proposal to create a FTAA. The EU is thus trying to
avoid being ousted from that continent. It also wants to avoid losing access
to and participation in the development of the new international trade rules.
In order not to be excluded from the shaping of these new rules, Europeans
tried to re–launch the interregional process by setting up a 48–million euro
package to deepen Mercosur (European Commission 2002, 5). The Union
also made a more significant trade proposal during the fifth meeting of the
BNC in July 2001, making it clear to South American leaders that if Merco-
sur breaks down, the EU will not sign a trade agreement with individual
countries.
The European proposal included all sectors: fishing, services, industry and
agriculture. The EU proposed gradual liberalisation over ten years, covering
100 per cent of manufactured goods and 90 per cent of agricultural produce.
By doing so, the EU has again contributed to the survival of Mercosur and
encouraged its member countries to come up with a counter–proposal on
behalf of their regional bloc. European persistence in recognising and
supporting regional groups (Andean Community, Central American Integra-
tion System,…) as international actors in their own right has, therefore,
contributed to the strengthening of their internal structures and the
reinforcement of their negotiation power internationally. That does not
mean, of course, that the differences thrown up by the trade negotiations
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have been erased. In its proposal, the EU did not offer cuts in subsidies; but
it did foresee greater liberalisation for products in which Mercosur is inter-
ested through the increase in preferential tariff quotas. However, Mercosur
member states were disappointed and this was reflected in their proposal.
They even proposed a gradual liberalisation over ten years, covering 86 per
cent of manufactured goods and 100 per cent of agricultural produce. The
car industry, which is a sensitive issue for Mercosur and a priority for the EU,
has not been included in the proposal. Moreover, Mercosur countries, and
especially Brazil, are very reticent about opening advantages to external
competitors in the areas of services, investments and public procurement.
While the proposals of the EU and Mercosur reflect differences of opinion,
they formed an important platform for the negotiators from the two regions
and allowed them to make progress in the talks. European trade Commis-
sioner Pascal Lamy was determined to conclude an agreement before the end
of the Prodi Commission’s mandate in 2004 and he was given a date for the
finalisation of the negotiations by the EU Council. During the Guadalajara
summit between the heads of state and the governments of the EU, Latin
America and the Caribbean, the Europeans officially announced an agree-
ment would be concluded in October 2004; according to officials, the chap-
ters on the political dialogue and cooperation were already completed.
This acceleration in the negotiations owes much to the failure of the
September 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference, as well as the race to
reach bilateral trade agreements, which were launched by the US to advance
the FTAA. After the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference of Seattle in
1999, the rich countries, and particularly the EU, placed all their hopes in the
Cancun meeting. However, the 13 August 2003 compromise reached
between Pascal Lamy and his US counterpart, Robert Zoellick, was not to
the liking of some ‘emerging economic powers’ (Brazil, India, South Africa
and China) which created the Group of Twenty (G–20). This European–US
compromise, which fixed a common position on the opening of the agricul-
tural market, subsidies and antidumping measures, defined in advance the
limited scope of any agricultural agreement. In addition, the EU and the US
omitted to give detailed figures and a calendar for the reduction of subsidies
for the production and exporting of agricultural produce. A second source of
contention, which emerged alongside agriculture, were the ‘Singapore issues’
(investment, competition, transparency of public–procurement markets and
trade facilitation) and the liberalisation of services. These issues are of great
importance for the transnational companies of rich countries, but problem-
atic for the developing countries. Given that everyone stuck to their line, the
split between the rich countries and the G–20 was quickly confirmed, result-
ing in the failure of the negotiations (Narlikar & Wilkinson 2004).
Faced with this fiasco, the US and the EU embarked on a frantic race
to create bilateral agreements. The US has, therefore, demonstrated its will
to act by trying to regain control of the negotiation process of the project to
integrate the Americas. Eager to make progress with the FTAA, Robert
Zoellick signed a Free Trade Agreement with Central America (CAFTA) and
has initiated the promotion of bilateral trade agreements with countries such
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as Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia in the belief that they could ‘stimu-
late the FTAA’. Such agreements, which are tailored to suit particular circum-
stances, are seen by Washington as a means of bolstering its negotiating
position and putting the South American bloc, which is in the process of
unification, in a difficult situation.13
However, the similarities between the participants and between the
topics on the WTO agenda and the FTAA agenda make it harder to set up
pan–American transregionalism. The FTAA has given rise to reservations
within Mercosur, and above all in Brazil, while the US is refusing to do
away with protectionism and agricultural subsidies. It is this very same
motivation to see agriculture liberalised at a multilateral level that led
Brazil and Argentina to ally with approximately twenty countries with
different levels of development and differing interests in a whole range of
matters on the global trade agenda. In reality, the fate of the FTAA has
always depended on WTO agreements, because US negotiators have set
themselves the objective of setting up a WTO–plus agreement, according to
which concessions made by the countries must exceed those negotiated
within the multilateral framework. The failure at Cancun will, therefore,
directly affect the FTAA, since, contrary to Washington’s wishes, the aspi-
rations for the project will have to be seriously revised and reduced. In a
ministerial dispute in Miami on 21 November 2003 between Brazil and the
US, which were co–chairing the final phase of negotiations, Brasilia
succeeded in convincing others, notably the US authorities, of the need for
a small–scale and à–la–carte FTAA (dubbed “FTAA–Lite”) (Moreira
Garcia, 2004, 42). This went against the ‘single undertaking’ principle
made during the ministerial meeting in San José (Costa Rica) in March
1998 and opened up the possibility of creating an international treaty,
which included all the topics discussed by the working groups and
accepted by all of the parties involved.
In Miami, the FTAA project and Cancun became intertwined. By decid-
ing to negotiate the agricultural dossier solely within the WTO, the Bush
administration, therefore, also found itself forced to accept the Brazilian
demand to refer negotiations on investment protection, the liberalisation of
services, intellectual property and government procurement to the WTO.
The Miami compromise allows the thirty–four participating countries to
choose the sectors and products in which they would like to participate.
Consequently, the project that was still being proposed by the US in the
FTAA — and by extension to the south of NAFTA — has been aban-
doned. To some extent, this is the result of the US turning away from Latin
America since the 11 September 2001 attacks, which have focused the
country’s attention on the fight against terrorism and the wars it has led in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the US presidential elections of 2004
prevented the current Bush administration from making any trade conces-
sions, a position that only weakens the US negotiating position under the
FTAA project.
As far as the members of the South American bloc are concerned, the
Miami agreement is an arrangement that allows Mercosur to focus more
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calmly on its deepening and enlargement towards the rest of the subconti-
nent.14 Moreover, for the Brazilian authorities above all, according to Itam-
araty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Miami Compromise means that
the competition mainly from the US and Canada (resulting from a flexible
FTAA–Lite) is no longer a threat to the industrial development of Brazil.
Mercosur is perceived in Brazil as a means of transforming the country into
an industrial power in the region (Turcotte, 2003). It is for this reason that
the Brazilian authorities are seeking to establish themselves as the privileged
provider of that country’s partners for a large number of strategic sectors
with high added value, such as capital goods, chemical products, information
technology products, motor vehicles and so on.
On behalf of the EU, the European Commission also decided, after the fail-
ure of Cancun and within the limits of its mandate, to move forward swiftly
on the interregionalist road. Although the FTAA, the trade negotiations
between the EU and Mercosur and the WTO constitute three inter–linked
processes which are dependent on each other, Mercosur–EU negotiating
agenda does not seem to have been affected by the results of the Cancun
meeting, unlike the economic integration project of the Americas. The
ambitions of the FTAA project have had to be seriously reviewed and
reduced. The deadlock in the multilateral talks led the European Commis-
sion to forge ahead down the interregional path. The Commission denies that
the negotiations with Mercosur are suffering the same fate as those of the
FTAA, and continues to advocate a WTO–plus agreement with the South
American bloc. It is doing this because such an agreement would allow the
EU to forestall the G–20 front, in which Brazil is a leader, and therefore to
move ahead more easily in terms of multilateral liberalisation.
To complete the negotiations for an interregional association with Merco-
sur, in November 2003 the European executive drew up an ambitious work-
ing plan known as the ‘Brussels Programme’, within the limits of its mandate
received in June 1999 by the Council of the European Union. This working
plan set out five negotiating sessions and two ministerial meetings before
October 2004, so as to conclude the Association Agreement with Mercosur
before the end of the mandate of the Prodi Commission. The EU trade
representative managed to keep the Singapore Issues (investment, competi-
tion, transparency of public procurement markets and trade facilitation)
which caused so many problems during the meeting in Cancun, on the
Mercosur–EU negotiating agenda.
To ensure that the failure of the Cancun negotiations does not jeopardise
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur, the European Commission has
endeavoured to improve market–access conditions for agricultural products
from South America. The innovative aspect of the Commission’s proposal
lies not in the quota system as such, which was set out in July 2001 at the
fifth meeting of the BNC, but rather in the fact that the proposal increases
exports from Mercosur countries. In fact, since the Commission has no
authority to liberalise these ‘sensitive’ products, it is drawing up what is
known as the ‘single pocket principle’ to be applied to this quota system. This
principle would allow for immediate liberalisation of 50 per cent of export
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quotas and would make the remaining 50 per cent dependent on the outcome
of the Doha round of trade talks. The Commission claims not to be operating
two pockets — one for multilateral and one for interregional negotiations —
and is trying to ensure that the system avoids making concessions to Merco-
sur countries twice over.15
Moreover, during the third summit between heads of state and govern-
ment of the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean, held in late May 2004 in
Guadalajara, the EU announced officially that an interregional agreement
with Mercosur would be signed by 31 October 2004. However that agree-
ment has not been made at the time of writing, due to various difficulties in
the trade field. But despite these hindrances to negotiations, the EU is still
working towards reaching a WTO–plus agreement during 2005 with
Mercosur.
4. Conclusion
Since the early 1990s, various new interregional arrangements have been
concluded or are being negotiated. These arrangements can be seen as a
corollary of new regionalism, helping to shape the global political economy.
New interregionalism as well as new regionalism encourage and legitimise
the policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation as part of the
development of a globally integrated market. Yet interregionalism also
perpetuates trade arrangements with a strong North–South bias. It is often a
means to obtain trade concessions when negotiations become blocked at the
multilateral level. Hence, this type of relational arrangement is skewed
towards economic affairs aimed at opening up markets. The trade negotia-
tions are in conformity with the WTO’s rules and disciplines.
Moreover, questions of a political, security, cooperation and/or environ-
mental nature may be addressed in these frameworks. Interregional rela-
tions are therefore notable for their strategic nature. The group–to–group
strategy of the EU towards Mercosur represents a response to the transre-
gional strategy of the US towards the Americas. Unlike the EU, the US has
tried to destabilise Latin American regionalism. The EU constitutes an
external federator for regional groups such as Mercosur, which, when
facing its European contacts, is under pressure to speak with a single voice.
This first involves a considerable effort to harmonise the positions of the
South American countries. In addition, the European negotiators are bring-
ing to the negotiating table a number of subjects that are not yet part of
common policies within Mercosur. The Southern Cone region’s authorities
are therefore obliged to develop, with European support, new objectives for
their intra–regional agenda. The prospect of concluding an ambitious agree-
ment with the EU increases both the deepening and the international credi-
bility of Mercosur. Although ‘new interregionalism’ is a result of new
regionalism, interregionalism can save and contribute to the consolidation
of regional schemes.
Interregionalism is, thus, closely linked to the European Union’s intention
to play a greater role internationally. The emergence of interregionalist
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relational arrangements should be seen in the light of this intention. The
Union’s enthusiasm for negotiating interregional agreements is a “form of
economic diplomacy in keeping with the ‘gaps’ of the CFSP and compensates
for the discontinuities of this policy through a broad network of institution-
alised cooperation in which not only finance and trade circulate but also
‘political principles’ and ‘values’” (Petiteville 2004, 71). So, in spite of the
realists’ scepticism about the Union’s capacity to play an effective interna-
tional role, the EU has succeeded in turning itself into an international actor.
The EU has developed external relations that enable it to promote its inter-
ests, policies and internal values, while having recourse to cooperative means
rather than military might.
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Notes
1. ‘European Community’ is used here prior to the date of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) which trans-
formed the European Community into the European Union.
2. For a detailed analysis of the Rio Process, see Santander (2004a).
3. The political dialogue alludes to the actions and common positions, declarations or diplomatic
management. In reality, this dialogue allows the EU to establish diplomatic contacts with third
parties. See Gonzalez (1997).
4. For example, services in the areas of education, health (including social services) and culture, as well
as questions to do with investment, where the Council makes unanimous decisions.
5. Thanks to Fredrik Söderbaum for elucidating this point to the author.
6. The Andean Pact (currently the Andean Community) was created in 1969. The members are Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Chile was a founder member but withdrew in 1973, the
year Venezuela joined.
7. The Central American Common Market was created in 1960. The members are Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
8. Interview European Commission, DG Enterprise (26 April 2004).
9. According to the theory, membership of transregional arrangements “is more diffuse than in
traditional group–to–group dialogues; it does not necessarily coincide with regional groupings and
may include member states from more than two regions”, while hybrid agreements constitute a
relationship between regional groupings and single powers. Hänggi, (2000), pp. 6–7.
10. COPA: Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the European Union; COGECA: General
Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union.
11. This idea encompasses the view that agricultural production also takes account of food security,
landscape conservation, the protection of animals and employment, etc. Laurent (2001).
12. Authority given to the executive power by the legislative power to negotiate trade deals and submit
them for approval without possibility for amendments.
13. One should not forget that Brazil, supported by the others members of Mercosur, played a crucial
role in the creation of the G–20, which managed to block negotiations in Cancun, to the great
displeasure of the US and the EU.
14. A new step has been accomplished in favour of the South America integration. Indeed, Mercosur,
CAN, Chile, Guyana and Surinam signed an agreement, in December 2004 in Cusco (Peru),
establishing the South American Community of Nations. Bilbao (2004).
15. Interview with the European Commission, DG Agriculture, 27 April 2004.
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